



Jordan Paust's Comment, The Seizure and Recoveiy of the Mayaguez,'
demonstrates convincingly that careful scholarship and legal argument are
not equivalent. Relying on incomplete press reports and apparent pre-
conceptions, Paust presents a tinted vision of the Mayaguez crisis and some
rather bizarre legal conclusions. The many false steps and wrong turns need
to be enumerated before they become accepted through repetition.
1. Paust begins by pinning the location of the Mayaguez, when the
Cambodians seized it, at 6y miles off the Poulo Vai Islands in an area
claimed by Cambodia to be within its territorial waters. In a footnote we
learn that these islands were small and rocky and 60 miles off the Cam-
bodian coast. 2 Later in the Comment it is noted that the islands were claimed
by two other countries, and that four weeks after the Mayaguez crisis the
islands were captured by one of the claimants, Vietnam.3 But no mention
at all is made of a significant detail-that the seizure took place in an area
well-traveled by international shipping and in the most direct sea lane
between Hong Kong and Thailand (the route taken by the Mayaguez).4
2. Paust tilts the balance further in his second paragraph of facts. There
he quotes a Cambodian statement about some unidentified ships that
allegedly had carried saboteurs, CIA agents, and related threats. But Paust
cites no evidence that any commercial ships had actually carried arms or
espionage equipment in Cambodian territorial waters after the Khmer
Rouge took over the government of Cambodia. Although it was an unarmed
merchant ship heading toward Thailand,5 Paust would like us to believe
that the Cambodians had reason to perceive some menace in the S.S.
Mayaguez.
3. This tilt in emphasis is used to bolster a conclusion that it was reason-
able for Cambodia to stop and search the Mayaguez. Even if it was in the
territorial waters of islands claimed by Cambodia, the Mayaguez had a
I. Paust, The Seizure and Recovety of the Mayagucz, 85 YALE L.J. 774 (1976).
2. Id. at 775 n.3.
3. Id. at 784 & n.52.
4. Seiture of the Mayaguez: Hearings Before the Subcommn. on International Political
and Military Affairs of the House Conn. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. III, at 265, 267 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mayaguez Hearings]. At the time the
Mayaguez was seized, there were approximately 10 to 12 ships passing through that very
area off the Poulo Wai Islands each day. Id.
5. See SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRs OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL REL.TIONS, 94TIx CONG., 2D SESs., REPORTS OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL ON THE SEIZURE OF THE MAYAGUEZ 61-62, 127 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
cited as MAYAGUEZ REPORT]. The report also refutes Paust's assumption that the
Mayaguez was heading toward the Cambodian island of Koh Tang. Id. at 64.
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right of innocent passage-i.e., a right to pass through Cambodian waters
for the purpose of proceeding from one port to another. Cambodia, as a
coastal state, could inspect the Mayaguez if there was a reasonable basis to
suspect that the vessel's passage was not innocent. This is, so far, consistent
with Articles 14(4) and 16(1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone.0 But from there, Paust seemingly leaps to the
conclusion that reasonableness is to be determined subjectively-that al-
though there was no objective basis to suspect the Mayaguez of noninnocent
behavior,7 Cambodian perceptions of some external threat made a suspicion
of the Mayaguez "reasonable." At the very least, Paust believes that in-
ternational law accords coastal states broad discretion to stop and search
ships in the territorial sea. Yet Paust avoids discussion of Article 15(1) of
the 1958 Convention, which says that the coastal state "must not hamper
innocent passage through the territorial sea." Use of an expansive term
like "hamper" must place some objective limitations on a coastal state's
right to stop ships. It is incomprehensible that one would take up the
Cambodians' banner without coming to grips with this Article 15(1)
language.
4. Even if there was a reasonable basis justifying a search of the Maya-
guez, it does not follow that the Cambodians had any right to seize the
vessel and its crew. Paust assumes that a search and seizure are parts of a
single right. However, a coastal state has the right to take a vessel into
custody only if, upon inspection, there is concrete evidence that the vessel's
passage is not innocent-i.e., if the ship has violated the coastal state's
domestic laws or security.5 The Cambodians never found any such evi-
dence, because there was none. Moreover, the Cambodians never bothered
to inspect any of the containers on board the Mayaguez, either before or
after seizing it.9
5. In an attempt at irony that fades with repetition, Paust compares the
Mayaguez seizure with a contemporaneous seizure by the United States of
a Polish fishing trawler, the Kalmar. Again, Paust ignores critical dif-
ferences. Unlike the Mayaguez, the Kalmar was observed fishing, its trawl-
ing net in the water, within the United States Contiguous Fishing Zone, 10
miles from the California coast. Consistent with customary international
law, the United States in 1966 had established an exclusive contiguous
fishing zone extending 12 miles from its coast.' 0 It was beyond question
6. [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
7. As mentioned earlier, the Mayaguez was heading toward Thailand, not Cambodia.
It was not doing anything suspicious. There was no evidence that other ships in that
area, 60 miles from the Cambodian coast, were acting in a noninnocent way. So one is
left with some disproportionate Cambodian fear of an old container ship which, like
other merchant ships, was not flying any national flag when at sea. Mayaguez Hearings,
supra note 4, pt. II, at 208.
8. Seizure of a merchant ship without verification of suspected wrongdoing does not
simply hamper innocent passage contrary to Article 15(1) of the 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; it effectively denies the very right of innocent
passage. See M. McDOUGAL & AV. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANs 231-33 (1962).
9. MAYAGUEZ REPORT, supra note 5, at 127.
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091, 1092 (1970). An issue left unresolved in the 1958 Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguoui. Zone was whether a coastal state could establish
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that the Kalmar was engaged, not in innocent passage, but in an activity
(fishing) in violation of an internationally accepted form of domestic
regulation. After stopping the Kalnar, the Coast Guard, unlike the captors
of the Mayaguez, made an examination of the ship and observed further
evidence that the vessel had been fishing in violation of domestic law.
Also in stark contrast to the Cambodians, the Coast Guard permitted the
master of the Kalmar to use his radio in an attempt to contact Polish
authorities and arranged for the Polish consul to meet the Kalmar and its
crew when they arrived at the Coast Guard dock in San Francisco." In
short, a linking of the Mayaguez and Kalmar seizures is ludicrous.
6. Paust's edifice of argument totters further when he claims that the
Cambodians' right to search and seize a ship for security purposes does not
depend on the "ship's location in territorial waters or on the high seas."' 2
Paust assumes that there is some inherent right to search ships for security
reasons on the high seas, but he overlooks the fact that ships enjoy greater
rights on the high seas than in territorial waters: a right of "freedom of
navigation" on the high seas versus the innocent passage of the territorial
sea. The instances in which a merchant ship may be boarded on the high
seas are limited to those specified in Article 22 of the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas1 3 (which Paust fails to discuss). One of these limited exceptions
is where a search is based on authority conferred by treaty. That exception,
and not any inherent right, was asserted as the basis for stopping ships in
the two examples cited by Paust-the U.S. quarantine of Cuba during the
Cuban missile crisis and the search of vessels outside the territorial sea of
South Vietnam during the Vietnam war. The quarantine during the Cuban
missile crisis was undertaken as a regional collective enforcement action of
the Organization of American States, under Article 53 of the United Na-
tions Charter.' 4 As for the Vietnam example, South Vietnam in 1965 an-
nounced that it would strictly enforce, within a 12-mile contiguous zone,
its wartime immigration and customs regulations prohibiting the entry of
arms, supplies, and persons into South Vietnam except through prescribed
routes; ships in the contiguous zone heading toward South Vietnam outside
prescribed routes were subject to search. The treaty authority relied on was
Article 24 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone. Such examples, in my view, provide little support for Paust's
perception of an inherent right to search and seize vessels on the high seas,
based on a coastal state's balancing of its interests against those of the
world community.
7. Paust concedes that international law recognizes a state's use of force
when "necessary" to protect the lives of its nationals and "proportionate"
to that end. But of the Mayaguez seizure, Paust says that there "was never
a contiguous exclusive fisheries zone. By the time the United States established its 12-
mile fisheries zone in 1966, 60 other coastal states had already established similar zones.
See H.R. REP. No. 2086, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-8 (1966).
11. Fish and Wildlife Miscellaneous-Part 1: Hearings Before the Subconmm. on Fish-
cries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 156-58 (1975).
12. Paust, supra note 1, at 791.
13. [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
14.. See A. CAYs, THE CU3AN MISSILE CRIsIs 57-62 (1974).
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any showing that the lives of the crew were in danger, nor were there any
reasonable grounds for believing that they were."' 5 Paust has either ignored
or failed to research relevant information. It has been reported that
thousands of human beings were killed following the Khmer Rouge take-
over in Cambodia; that summary executions had been carried out by local
Cambodian commanders; that the Khmer government was extremely an-
tagonistic to the United States.1 The Deputy Secretary of State testified
that, "[i]n view of the Khmer authorities' hostility toward the United States,
the probable conduct of the Cambodians toward the captured Americans
was unpredictable."' 7 In this context, there may have been (and I believe
there was) legal significance in Cambodia's failure to give assurances re-
garding the crew's safety in the first 60 hours following their arrest. In
support of his contrary view (that it was unreasonable to believe the crew
to be in danger), Paust assumes that American decisionmakers had in-
formation that the Cambodians had previously released unharmed a Pana-
manian crew that included Americans. But a claim that there were
American crew members on the Panamanian ship seems first to have been
made by the Cambodians themselves a week after the Mayaguez incident.'8
8. Paust says that the "Administration did not fear execution (of the
crew members], but lengthy detention and negotiations."' 9 This suggests
an interesting point, but Paust shifts the focus of inquiry to the "negotia-
tions" (can the prospect of humiliating negotiations justify the use of
force?) and away from the "detention" (can the prospect of a lengthy de-
tention of innocent merchant seamen justify the use of force?). In my view,
detaining innocent seamen for diplomatic ransom constitutes a violation
of human rights. The task for a sensitive scholar would be to relate the
prospect of such a detention to the countervailing considerations of seeking
a peaceful settlement of the dispute.
9. Paust criticizes the air attacks that occurred after the safety of the
Mayaguez crew was assured-attacks against an airfield and unused oil
refinery on the Cambodian mainland. Paust terms the attacks as unnecessary
and disproportionate, but makes no mention of the justification presented
by the Administration-that the attacks were designed to reduce the ability
of Cambodian forces on the mainland to threaten U.S. Marines then with-
drawing from Koh Tang Island. Paust should have considered (a) the inter-
national law consequences of a use of force to protect soldiers engaged in
an otherwise justified military action, and (b) whether the U.S. air attacks
were necessary and proportionate to the protection of the withdrawing
Marines.
10. Paust concludes by discussing the "precedential value" of what he
considers an illegal use of force by the United States. A more challenging
15. Paust, supra note 1, at 800.
16. See TniE, Apr. 26, 1976, at 8-11 (Asian ed.); N.Y. Times, May 6, 1975, at 1, col. 4;
id., May 9, 1975, at 1, col. 7; id., July 9, 1975, at 36, col. 2; Mayaguez Hearings, supra
note 4, pt. II, at 233-35.
17. Mayaguez Hearings, supra note 4, pt. III, at 257.
18. Id., pt. II, at 233.
19. Paust, supra note 1, at 801.
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approach would be to assume that the use of force was legally justified, but
to inquire whether the world community perceived it in a way that limits
or expands the precedent. In other words, will the Mayaguez incident have
a conditioning effect on the future use of force in the world community?
The question suggests a dynamic quality to the international legal process
which should be considered in an analysis of the Mayaguez case. But it is a
delicate point, one which is swamped in the passion of Paust's argument.
Michael David Sandler
Special Assistant to the Legal Advisor,
Department of State-
Author's Reply:
By way of introduction, Michael Sandier reminds us that press reports
are sometimes "incomplete." Now I am not an ardent defender of the
media, but in this case the media provided accurate detail that has, if any-
thing, been supplemented by the GAO Reports, not disproven. At the time
of the writing of my commentary, moreover, media coverage provided the
only indicia of fact made available to the public outside of published
government statements and Mr. Rowan's useful book.'
I did not rely merely on press reports; but that is a minor point. What
is significant about Mr. Sandler's remark is an apparent belief that one
who bases inquiry on public data (press reports, published government
statements, and books) is not engaging in objective, "careful," and useful
inquiry into decisionmaking by governmental officials. Exploring the im-
port of his remark further, one might imagine that since most of the mem-
bers of Congress received information about the Mayaguez affair from
public news sources,2 their thoughts about executive conduct are equally
tainted, especially since many of the relevant factors are still classified and
unavailable to the Congress, the public at large, and scholars.3
When the Reports of the Comptroller General were finally released to
the public last month, the executive criticism echoed a familiar ring. Con-
clusions reached concerning the failure adequately to use several channels
of diplomatic input and peaceful settlement and the unnecessary, excessive
use of force were dismissed by the President and the Secretary of State as
"- The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the
Department of State.
I. R. ROWAN, THE FOUR DAYS OF MAYAGUEZ (1975).
2. See SUaco.mm. ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE HousE
COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORTS OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL ON THE SEIZURE OF THE MAYAGUEZ 133, 141 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited
as MAYAuEZ REPORT].
3. Id. at vi, 58-59, 62-63, 67-69, 98, 106-07, 115 (GAO "unable to confirm").
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biased, tainted "second guessing" and "Monday morning quarterbacking."
Similar criticism had been expressed by high-ranking officials in the De-
partments of State and Defense through letters to the GAO in March
1976.- The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management added: "[I]t
is time we-all of us-put a stop to this wholly senseless and highly destruc-
tive tendency constantly to find fault with everything our Government
does."5
"Second guessing" and "Monday morning quarterbacking," we are to
believe, are appropriate labels for serious inquiry into the legality of
presidential decisions that were, presumably, made during a four-day
"crisis." These labels seem to serve two functions: (I) to dismiss any
criticism from those outside the circle of "the few" as "unrealistic" (i.e.,
"you weren't there"), and (2) to justify, in Machiavellian fashion, the
errors of princes and prince-followers. Upon close inspection, however, such
claims amount either to an implicit admission of error or a blatantly
elitist attempt to avoid criticism and the necessary public scrutiny of public
officials and their public deeds. This seems all the more evident when
disagreement and criticism occurred within the federal government both
at the time of the seizure0 and afterward.7
In my opinion, trite phrases lifted from the idiom of sports are hardly
appropriate to debate about presidential decisionmaking, the use of military
force, or the propriety of action taken in view of relevant constitutional
and international law. If we are interested in assuring a democratic govern-
mental process, criticism must be allowed, even encouraged.8 The alterna-
tive, fostered by claims to secrecy and a denial of public inquiry after the
fact, is nothing less than an unconstitutional dictatorship.
How cute, at first blush, such phrases appear. But to me, they smack of
an elitism that is ultimately unrealistic (because only self-deception seems
ultimately to be served) and unauthoritative. The President and his ad-
visers are not beyond criticism, 9 nor are they beyond the law or legal
inquiry.10 As the Supreme Court declared in United States v. Lee:
4. Id. at 108-11 ("inadequate and misleading," "ex post facto diplomacy by amateurs,"
"second-guess," "hindsight," "realities," "after-the-fact analysis," "physical and fiscal
facts of life").
5. Id. at 109. The statement of the Deputy Under Secretary demonstrates the nefarious
notion of authority and a separation of a people from their government that Richard
Nixon proposed to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth
Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 231, 242-43 (1975). Mr.
Sandier is so confused on this point that he equates my own criticism of an executive
decision with the taking up of Communist Cambodia's "banner." M. Sandier, Letter, at
p. 204 supra.
6. See Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774, 778. See
also MAYAGUEZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 69.
7. See MAYAGUEZ REPORT, supra note 2.
8. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715-17, 728 (1971) (Black,
Stewart, JJ., concurring respectively); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 354 (1964).
9. Cf. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concur-
ring) (role of press to expose deception in government).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196, 219-20 (1882).
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No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No
officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the
officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures
of the law, and are bound to obey it.
It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every
man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the
more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which
it gives."
Further, there can be no exception to the authority of law merely because
decisions are made in time of "crisis."' 2 As the Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs wrote upon
release of the GAO Reports and House Subcommittee material: "[T]he
reestablishment of mutual confidence . . . between the Government and
the people" can "only be accomplished by in-depth congressional explora-
tion of the handling of the Mayaguez crisis and by the public disclosure of
as much information as possible relating to the conduct of the public's
business."' 3
Mr. Sandler sharpens debate, however, by addressing specific points of
contention. Here, I will respond to his 10 criticisms with 10 counterpoints.
1. Yes, the Mayaguez was 6V miles off the Poulo Wai Islands in claimed
territorial waters. No, the Mayaguez was not within a well-traveled inter-
national shipping lane when it was seized. The Mayaguez had traveled off
course,' 4 and ships did not normally pass within 6V2 miles of the islands.15
Further, the United States knew that Cambodia claimed a 12-mile terri-
torial sea.16
2. I suggest that a distinction between fishing or other private vessels
and "commercial" vessels is of no legal relevance here. Cambodia claimed
that numerous vessels had engaged in harmful military and espionage
activities.' 7
3. I disagree. There were "objective" bases for reasonable suspicion of
noninnocent passage, and I documented these in my commentary. These
included: location of the vessel, size, and context.' s Mr. Sandier adds
another: the Mayaguez was not flying any national flag.' 9 Further, I did
not avoid discussion of Article 15(1) and the problem posed by textual and
customary distinction between "innocent" and "noninnocent" passage and
11. 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
12. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); In re Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1 (1946); United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 628 (1871).
13. MAYAGUEz REPORT, supra note 2, at v.
14. R. ROWAN, supra note 1, at 17.
15. See id. at 25.
16. See Paust, supra note 6, at 778, 782-84; MAYAGUEZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
See also id. at 72, 117 (U.S. aircraft restricted to outside 12-mile zone).
17. See Paust, supra note 6, at 792-93.
18. Id. at 775-77, 792-95. And why were merchant ships principal targets when U.S.
aircraft struck? See MAYAGuEZ REPoRT, supra note 2, at 96, 97.
19. See M. Sandier, Letter, at p. 204 n.7 supra.
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the reasonableness of coastal state actions in various cases.2 0 My analysis,
in fact, stands in sharp contrast to a textualist reliance on the phrase
"hamper innocent" which ultimately begs the very question to be ad-
dressed: whether a given passage, under the circumstances, is "innocent."
This is especially so in view of the textual dichotomy posed by Article
16(1) of the Convention. I note also that Mr. Sandler did not address the
specific examples used in my analysis of coastal state inspection, especially
the claim of South Vietnam-approved by the United States-to visit and
search vessels that were "not clearly engaged in innocent" passage.2 1
4. There is no law requiring the search of 274 35-foot containers and a
10,000-ton vessel to be made only at the very spot of seizure. Precedents
exist to the contrary; and no rule is cited by Mr. Sandler for his rigid
position. Furthermore, as pointed out in my commentary, there is no
evidence that the Cambodians seized the Mayaguez for any purpose other
than to search the ship.22 The "inspection" was not completed because of
the interference by American military force. Indeed, one can hardly "in-
spect" a ship while being shot at! The "evidence," Mr. Sandler, may very
well have existed. Your assertions to the contrary are not convincing.23
Readers of the Yale Law Journal need not be reminded that when Mr.
Sandler writes: "not innocent-i.e., if the ship has violated the coastal
state's domestic laws or security," his examples do not exhaust relevant
criteria for decision about innocence. But just to avoid any misconception,
Article 14(4) of the Convention2 4 provides that passage is innocent "so long
as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
state" and, apparently, where it is also consistent with "other rules of in-
ternational law" (such as the showing of one's flag).
5. I never alleged or hinted at the possibility that the Mayaguez was
engaged in fishing. However, I do admit that the Mayaguez and the Kalmar
were within a 12-mile zone when spotted and, further, that "objective"
evidence existed in both cases to support a reasonable belief that the
vessel was not engaged in "innocent" passage or activity. Contrary to the
implication that the "captors of the Mayaguez" made no examination of the
ship to observe "further evidence," the Cambodians did board the Mayaguez
in an initial attempt at investigation.2 5 The failure to communicate, locked
doors, and numerous containers posed problems to be sure. But the in-
vestigation of "further evidence" was interrupted by American military
actions. What is "ludicrous," I aver, is the circular reasoning that since
American military action interfered with examination of the Mayaguez but
Polish military action did not interfere with examination of the Kalmar,
20. See Paust, supra note 6, at 785-91. For discussion of the subjective nature of the
distinction, see Knight, Issues Before the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, 34 LA. L. REV. 155, 183-84 (1974); Comment, The Mayaguez: The Right of
Innocent Passage and the Legality of Reprisal, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 765, 772-73 (1976).
21. Id. at 789 n.72; MAYAGU.Z REPORT, supra note 2, at 10, 28-31.
22. See Paust, supra note 6, at 777, 793-94.
23. See id. at 793 &: n.91; MAYAGUEZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 127; R. ROWAN, supra
note 1, at 42-43, 96, 100.
24. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.1.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
25. R. ROWAN, supra note 1, at 42-43, 52-64, 81-84, 96, 100.
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the discovery of impropriety by the Kalmar was a basis for the legality of
an American response, but the failure of the Cambodians to carry out an
investigation was a basis for a purported illegality on their part. Here
again is an attempt to beg a fundamental question.
6. Please, Mr. Sandier, I did not "assume" that a customary right to
search ships for security reasons on the high seas exists, I documented such
a customary expectation.26 Moreover, this right was analyzed in the alterna-
tive.
There is room for disagreement whether Article 22 of the High Seas Con-
vention is dispositive of law, especially in view of the preamble to that
Convention. However, since the customary right at stake relates to self-
defense, 27 there is apparent agreement that Article 22 of the High Seas
Convention incorporates, at least, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which
itself partly implements the customary right to self-defense.2s I remind Mr.
Sandler that the contiguous zone, in the case of South Vietnam, was a zone
of the "high seas" contiguous to South Vietnam's territorial sea, within
the meaning of Article 24 of the Convention. 'Thus, the Vietnam example
is relevant to claims made to engage in certain action on the high seas.
Moreover, all admit that the U.S. quarantine activity during the Cuban
missile crisis took place on the high seas.
7. With regard to a "fear" that the lives of the crew were in imminent
danger, it seems significant to add that recently disclosed facts now demon-
strate that the message from the American Embassy to the White House,
CIA, NSA, DIA, NMCC, and concerned commands on May 12th (the day
of the seizure) disclosed: "no casualties; crew does not feel to be in im-
mediate danger; troops on board do not speak English, crew standing by
for any instructions."29 In view of this new information, I find my state-
ments strengthened. 30
With regard to the statement that a claim that there were American crew
members on the Panamanian ship first came from the Cambodians "a week
after the Mayaguez incident," a careful reading of the New York Times
discloses that this was public information at least by May l5th.3 1 How
much sooner it was known by U.S. intelligence agencies has not been
published.
8. In my view, a sensitive scholar would not conclude that military force
can be used to save Americans from a postulated prospect of "lengthy de-
tention" when, after the passage of only three days, peaceful settlement had
not been exhausted. In this regard I note that not only was the Israeli
rescue in Uganda more skillful, but it was clearly more necessary and
proportionate.
26. Paust, supra note 6, at 791.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 787. On the dimensions of tli right to self-defense, see the sources cited
in id. at 787 nn.64, 65-cspecially McDougal & Schlei, Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspec-
tive, 64 YALE L.J. 648, 674-76 (1955).
29. MAYAGuEz REPORT, supra note 2, at 32, 116.
30. See Paust, supra note 6, at 800-01. The Deputy Secretary stated only that the
"probable conduct" was "unpredictable." Actually, the U.S. was uncertain about any in-
tention or likelihood. See MAYAGUEZ REiORT, supra note 2, at 100.
31. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1975, at 15, col. 7.
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9. Whenever military force is used, it must meet the tests of necessity
and proportionality.32 Attacks "designed to reduce" the ability of the Cam-
bodians to engage in military countermeasures may not have been attacks
that were necessary to reduce such an ability. And even if the attacks were
necessary for that purpose, the question remains unanswered whether, under
the circumstances, it was necessary to destroy that ability at all.
Congressman Riegle seemed aptly to express the question when he stated:
"I haven't seen anything yet that assures me this kind of military action was
necessary and appropriate. Maybe there is evidence that can support that,
but if there is, it hasn't been presented before this committee." 33 Such
evidence is still lacking.
Indeed, the GAO Report did not adequately address the issue. It merely
noted that the Pentagon thought its actions "reasonable" and that the
mainland was bombed because Cambodia had a "capability to interfere."34
The GAO did not "question" such a purpose; but the legal question re-
mains, especially in view of other important factual challenges made by
the GAO.35
10. Since neither I nor the "world community" as a whole seem to
"assume" legal propriety, the basis for the unarticulated "delicate point"
seems lacking.
Far from destroying the legal edifice, or even proving a "tilt," it is my
opinion that this interchange strengthens the conclusions reached in the
commentary on the seizure and recovery of the Mayaguez. Although Mr.
Sandler did not mention significant GAO support for such analyses and
outcomes, one can objectify the record further with recently published
evidence of the extent of failure of the Ford Administration to pursue
reasonably available diplomatic (i.e., peaceful) alternatives to violence.
Indeed, the GAO study has revealed a most damaging piece of evidence
to supplement the record of the Ford Administration's failure adequately
to explore U.N. channels. At 4:56 A.M., May 14th, an American embassy
in the Middle East sent a message to the Secretary of State that a foreign
government (still undisclosed) was using its influence with Cambodia to
seek an early release of the Mayaguez and expected the ship to be released
soon.3 6 A careful reading of the GAO study leads to a conclusion that the
foreign government mentioned in the message as still using its influence
32. See Paust, supra note 6, at 800-01; U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, paras. 33, 39, 41 & 56 (Field Man. No. 27-10, 1956). For general discussions of
limitations on the use of force, see LAW AN RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE 119-49 (P. Troob.
off ed. 1975); Paust, Weapons Regulation, Military Necessity and Legal Standards: Are
Contemporary Department of Defense "Practices" Inconsistent With Legal Norms? 4 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 229 (1974); Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader
Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REv. 99 (1972), and authorities cited therein. To beg the
question again, regarding "otherwise justified" military action, is unhelpful. See M.
Sandier, Letter, at p. 206 supra.
33. Seizure of the Mayaguez: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Political
and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. II, at 169 (1975). See id. at 163, 165 (statement of Rep. Schroeder).
34. MAYAGUEZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 61. See id. at 111 (point 3).
35. See id. at 103. Other important facts appear in id. ht 90-91, 94-97.
36. Id. at 60, 69, 114, 122. See id. at 67 (U.N. communication with Cambodians).
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and expecting a release soon was the People's Republic of China.37 Such
a significant diplomatic breakthrough should not have been ignored. This
diplomatic contact also magnifies the importance of the Secretary General's
announcement that he had communicated with the Cambodians and the
importance of the Cambodian radio broadcast that the Cambodians were
prepared to release the crew and ship.
On a related point, the GAO study noted that "several possibilities for
communication with the new Cambodian Government were not attempted;
contrary to Administration statements, GAO found no evidence that the
United States broadcast directly into Cambodia."' s
I express my thanks to the editors of the Yale Law Journal for having
initiated a useful vehicle to tighten point and counterpoint. Use of this
forum should expand.
Jordan J. Paust
Associate Professor of Law,
University of Houston
37. See id. at 66-69. Since (I) the government involved had refused "in Washington to
relay a message," id. at 69; (2) Huang Chen refused to accept a message in Washington, id.
at 66; (3) the goiernment involved was "using its influence with Cambodia," id. at 69;
and (4) the Secretary apparently felt that "no government except Chinese" had such
influence, id. at 68, it seems evident that the foreign government was the People's
Republic.
38. Id. at 60. See id. at 68.
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